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Abstract
The increasing use of mobile devices, along with advances in telecommunication
systems, increased the popularity of Location-Based Services (LBSs). In LBSs,
users share their exact location with a potentially untrusted Location-Based
Service Provider (LBSP). In such a scenario, user privacy becomes a major
concern: the knowledge about user location may lead to her identification as well
as a continuous tracing of her position. Researchers proposed several approaches
to preserve users’ location privacy. They also showed that hiding the location of
an LBS user is not enough to guarantee her privacy, i.e., user’s profile attributes
or background knowledge of an attacker may reveal the user’s identity. In this
paper we propose ABAKA, a novel collaborative approach that provides identity
privacy for LBS users considering users’ profile attributes. In particular, our
solution guarantees p-sensitive k-anonymity for the user that sends an LBS
request to the LBSP. ABAKA computes a cloaked area by collaborative multi-
hop forwarding of the LBS query, and using Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CP-ABE). We ran a thorough set of experiments to evaluate our
solution: the results confirm the feasibility and efficiency of our proposal.
Keywords: Location-Based Services, Privacy, k-anonymity, p-sensitivity,
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid development of mobile devices and advances of telecommu-
nications, mobile users tend to have ubiquitous access to information such as
traffic prediction or location map data. Location-Based Services (LBSs) are the
best examples of this new trend, allowing mobile users to receive information5
based on their geographical position [1]. Based on their location, mobile users
can access several types of information and services, e.g., getting the position of
the nearest gas station, restaurant or hospital.
An LBS consists of two major entities: a user (from now on referred also
as issuer of a query) who is interested in acquiring location-based service,10
and a Location-Based Service Provider (LBSP) which provides the desired
location-based service to the issuer. To obtain such a service, the issuer sends
her geographical location, along with her identity and the query to the LBSP.
Unfortunately, some queries (such as searching for the nearest hospital specialized
in a particular disease) may reveal privacy-sensitive information about the issuer.15
The growing interest of smartphone users in using LBSs leads to two major
privacy concerns: location privacy and identity privacy (also known as query
privacy). The former refers to preventing the disclosure of the exact location of an
issuer, while the latter is the ability of concealing the link between her identity and
her query. These two concepts are complementary, and therefore, guaranteeing20
both location and identity privacy for an issuer becomes a challenging task.
Researchers proposed several solutions providing location and identity privacy in
the context of LBSs (examples can be found in [2]). The location privacy problem
has also been studied extensively in other contexts such as sensor networks [3],
and cloud computing [4].25
A popular tool used in the literature to guarantee user’s identity privacy,
in the context of LBSs, is the concept of k-anonymity [5]. This concept refers
to a set of k users in which a target user is indistinguishable (with respect to
her location) from the other k − 1 individuals in the set. However, according
to [6], in the presence of an attacker with background knowledge about a user’s30
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profile attributes, we can only guarantee k-anonymity by considering anonymity
sets in which all the users have the same profile attributes. Furthermore, the
authors in [7] proved that k-anonymity is not sufficient to protect the privacy of
an individual’s attributes in a dataset, and might not prevent the disclosure of
sensitive attributes for the user. With respect to sensitive attributes, we refer to35
a precise definition in [8]: “an attribute whose values may be confidential for an
individual (subject to her/his preferences)”. Indeed, in the context of LBSs, the
semantics of an issued query might allow the LBSP to infer sensitive attributes
of an issuer’s profile, or even her identity [9].
In order to address this problem, researchers proposed a solution called40
p-sensitive k-anonymity [7, 9, 10], in which at least p different values for each
group of sensitive attributes are used. In the context of LBSs, this translates in
ensuring that the anonymity set for an issuer contains individuals with diverse
values for a specific set of privacy-sensitive attributes. In this paper, inspired by
the concept of “personalized privacy preservation” by Xiao and Tao in [8], we45
give the opportunity to the issuer of a query to decide her preferences in sensitive
attributes, based on her query content and physical location. We provided this
feature for the issuer, due to the fact that an attribute could be sensitive for a
query in special location, and insensitive for another query in another location-
(we will further clarify this matter in the following). Before introducing the key50
contribution of the paper, we present a running example.
Medical help example. Consider a set of smartphone users in a geographical area.
We assume that each user is assigned a profile that consists of five attributes:
{Gender , Age, Nationality , Job, Zip-code}. Suppose a user u1 is a 19-year-old
Finnish girl living in Italy. She is looking for a pregnancy help center near55
her house, where the doctors are able to speak English. She sends an LBS
query Q= “where is the nearest pregnancy help center with English speaking
doctors?” and wants to cloak her location while being 9-anonymous. In this
example, based on the content of the query, the attributes Gender and Zip-code
should be identical between all the users in the anonymity set (i.e., providing60
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profile k-anonymity). Moreover, based on the semantics of the issued query,
Age and Nationality are sensitive attributes of u1. It should be noted that age
and nationality are not sensitive attributes per se, but due to the fact that
the issuer is in Italy, her nationality could reveal her identity. Moreover, her
query semantics (i.e., being pregnant) strongly relates to her age. Therefore,65
we consider these two attributes to be her sensitive attributes. Assume that
she computes a cloaked area using one of the existing k-anonymity preserving
methods, and sends her query to the LBSP. Given the fact that she is looking
for an English speaking doctor, a malicious LBSP can infer that the issuer is
foreigner. Moreover, suppose that there are only two foreign users in her cloaked70
area: one 19 years old (u1) and the other 50 years old. In such case, if the
attacker has this background knowledge, he can infer that the issuer is likely to
be u1. This example emphasizes the fact that, based on the query semantics
and considering the attacker’s background knowledge, some attributes could be
sensitive in specific scenarios and reveal the identity of the issuer. A proper75
privacy preserving solution should take into account sensitive attributes of u1,
according to the semantics of the query. For example, a solution could provide
an anonymity set in which all the k users are non-Italian (i.e., providing profile
k-anonymity) and there are enough diversity in age attribute (i.e., providing
p-sensitivity considering the more probable values for being pregnant).80
Contribution. In this paper, we propose ABAKA (Attribute-Based k-Anonymous
collaborative solution for LBSs), a novel solution to provide both identity, and
location privacy for LBS users taking into account the profile attributes of the
users. Our motivation is the existing limitations of the prior research in the
area of LBS users’ privacy: on the one hand, those researches which attempt85
to ensure k-anonymity considering the profile of the users (such as in [6]) are
centralized; and on the other hand, the existing distributed approaches do not
consider profile attributes of the LBS users (such as in [11]).
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We propose ABAKA, the first privacy-preserving LBS system that guar-90
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antees p-sensitive k-anonymity running a TTP-free protocol between par-
ticipating users (Section 4). In particular, ABAKA has the following
features:
– It cloaks the exact location of a user into a cloaked area of arbitrary
size, by ensuring that (at least) k− 1 collaborating users will forward95
a query in a random multi-hop path within the cloaked area.
– ABAKA guarantees p-sensitivity by ensuring that the collaborating
users in the anonymity set, which will forward the query, have specific
attributes selected by the issuer. Each issuer can select a desired set
of attributes based on the semantics of the query she wants to send.100
In particular, with ABAKA she can decide: (i) which attributes need
to be identical within an anonymity set; and (ii) which attributes
are sensitive, and thus need to have p different values within the
anonymity set.
– ABAKA adopts Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-105
ABE) [12], in order to apply fine-grained access control over encrypted
data, by defining high-level access policies as a combination of at-
tributes. CP-ABE allows the issuer to specify attribute-based policies
on the query; in this way, she ensures that other k − 1 collaborative
users have the desired attributes.110
– ABAKA ensures the confidentiality of the query, by using public key
encryption.
• We run a systematic performance evaluation of ABAKA using two different
datasets (Section 5.1) and a thorough evaluation of the computational
overhead imposed by cryptographic processing required by ABAKA (Sec-115
tion 5.2). Our evaluation demonstrates that ABAKA is feasible on both
smartphone and PC platforms.
5
2. Background on Attribute-Based Encryption
In what follows, we introduce the fundamental concepts about Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE), and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption120
(CP-ABE) in particular. In 2005, Sahai and Waters introduced a Fuzzy Identity-
Based Encryption scheme [13], called ABE. This scheme is a public key encryption
protocol that allows an encryptor to specify fine-grained access control policies
over data. In this scheme, each user is assigned a set of attributes (e.g., Gender,
Age, or Job). The data owner encrypts a plaintext in such a way that all the125
users that have a specific set of attributes will be able to decrypt the ciphertext
(i.e., if user’s attributes satisfy the policy over the data). CP-ABE [12] is a
type of ABE in which the access policy is included into the ciphertext, and
expressed as a combination of attributes. An example of such a policy is:
(Age = 19 ∧Gender = female) ∨ (Nationality = Italian) (see Figure ??).130
Each user has a private decryption key, which represents the set of attributes
she owns. She will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if a subset of
her attributes satisfies the access policy on the data. By construction, in the
CP-ABE scheme only the key issuer (i.e., a Certificate Authority) is able to
generate new private keys, therefore preventing collusion attacks [12].135
In general, a CP-ABE scheme provides the following functions:
• Setup. It takes as input an implicit security parameter, and outputs the
public key pk, and the master key MK .
• Encryption. It takes as input a message M , an access policy A, and the
public key pk, and outputs the corresponding ciphertext E.140
• KeyGen. It takes as input a set of attributes A = {A1, A2, · · ·, An}, the
master key MK and the public key pk. It outputs a decryption key D
reflecting the given attributes.
• Decryption. It takes as input the ciphertext E that is encrypted under
the access policy P ; the decryption key D representing a set of attributes γ;145
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and the public key pk. It outputs the message M if and only if A “satisfies”
the access policy P .
Several researches adopt ABE to provide access control and location privacy.
For example, adopting CP-ABE, Dargahi et al. [14] proposed a k-anonymous
collaborative approach to provide location and identity privacy in the context150
of Location Based Services (LBS). Zhu et al. [4] used KP-ABE scheme in LBS
in order to: i) protect the privacy of the issuer against LBSP by enforcing
the user authentication process to be accomplished on the client-side, and ii)
control the access to exchanged data between the issuer and the LBSP through
defining access policies. In another work, Yang et al. [15] proposed a privacy155
preserving method for vehicular location based services. In this scheme, each
user encrypts her location information using ABE, while defining desired access
policy, and shares her encrypted location in online social sites. Leveraging ABE,
the authors protect the location information of the users against third party
attackers. Different from the state-of-the-art, for the first time, we adopt ABE in160
ABAKA in order to find k−1 collaborating users who have our desired attributes
in their profiles, to provide p-sensitivity as well as k-anonymity.
3. Model and assumptions
In this section, we provide some definitions and assumptions that will be
used in the remainder of the paper. Table 1 reports the used notation.165
3.1. System Model
We consider a set of users U = {u1, u2, · · ·, um} in a geographical area.
Each user can be a potential LBS user (i.e., an issuer) and is equipped with a
location-aware wireless device (e.g., smartphone or tablet) that is able to retrieve
the coordinates associated with its position. We assume the users to be mostly170
stationary (from the time the issuer sends out the query until when she receives
the response back), or to have limited mobility. Users can communicate with
their neighboring users over a wireless medium (e.g., via WiFi) via a single-hop
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or a multi-hop route. Moreover, we assume that users ignore received packets
that are not intended for them (which they could receive due to the broadcast175
nature of the wireless communication). We consider the ad hoc model due to the
increasing trend in opportunistic networks and device-to-device communications,
where several mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) collaborate in order to forward
messages using wireless technologies, such as Bluetooth or WiFi [16, 17]. This
model has been extensively used and analyzed in several works in the literature,180
such as [16, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Table 1: Notation table.
Notation Description
Q, R Location-based query and response, respectively
s, r Issuer-generated random numbers
pkL,skL
Respectively, public and private key pair of the
LBSP
ku , sku
Respectively, symmetric key and private CP-ABE
key of u
kr Symmetric key of collaborating users
pk Public CP-ABE key
CpabeEncpk(ptxt ,p)
Encryption of a plaintext ptxt applying a policy
p, with CP-ABE
Enck(ptxt)
Symmetric encryption of a plaintext ptxt , using
key k
We assume that each user is assigned a profile which consists of a set of
attributes A = {A1, A2, · · ·, An}. These attributes can be of different types:
personal information (e.g., gender), employment information (e.g., job), and
contact information (e.g, Zip-code). In our medical help example, we consider185
the following profile attributes: {A1 : Gender ,A2 : Age,A3 : Nationality ,A4 :
Job,A5 : Zip-code}. We also assume that none of the users have exact infor-
mation about the number of users in her vicinity, and their profile attributes.
We consider the LBSP to be untrusted, and assume that each LBS user does
not want to share her exact location and identity (ID) with the LBSP. In our190
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model, the issuer sends her request to the LBSP through a multi-hop path, to
anonymize her location and identity. Our multi-hop approach is similar to the
work in [20, 22], however in ABAKA the issuer looks for a set of collaborating
users having specific attributes, who cooperate with each other to anonymize
the location of the issuer. We also assume that each user, based on its own195
policy, decides whether to participate in the anonymizing process. One may
think of an incentive mechanism in order to motivate users to participate in our
collaborative scheme. There are several monetary and non-monetary incentive
schemes in the literature [23], which could be considered to be a complement
for ABAKA. One possible approach, to be used, could be the privacy-aware200
incentive mechanism proposed in [24], which is a TTP-free scheme based on
blind signature. However, an encouraging mechanism is out of the scope of this
paper (and an orthogonal open research problem, as pointed out by Conti et
al. [25]), and we leave it as future work.
We assume that the LBSP has a pair of keys: a public key pkL, and a private205
key skL that are used to preserve confidentiality and integrity of the message sent
by the issuer to the LBSP. Moreover, we suppose that there could be multiple
Certification Authorities (CAs) [26], each of which being responsible for a specific
geographical area (e.g., states or municipalities), to authenticate the users and
assign them CP-ABE private keys (users key management is out of the scope210
of this paper). Each user obtains a CP-ABE private key based on her profile
attributes, from the CA nearest to her location. The CP-ABE private key will
be used for authentication of collaborating users, and fulfilling the requirement
of p-sensitivity. Furthermore, CAs provide the CP-ABE public key, that the
issuer uses to encrypt her query specifying an access policy. In our solution, we215
assume each user to contact the nearest CA when her profile attributes change,
in order to retrieve a new CP-ABE private key. Note that this does not change
the collaborative nature of our approach. We also assume each user ui has a
symmetric key, kui , which can be a random number defined by ui. The user
ui will use this key to encrypt/decrypt a special field of the packet during the220
packet forwarding procedure. Moreover, the issuer generates a random group
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secret key, kr, for the collaborating users.
Finally, in our model each user can specify her privacy requirements in terms
of size k of the anonymity set, number of users with specific issuer-defined
attributes p, and the largest and smallest desired cloaked area size. Also, we225
assume the issuer to not issue any query that the query content could lead to
her identification or reveal information about her exact location (otherwise the
use of anonymity preserving approaches would not make much sense).
3.2. Adversary Model
We consider two types of adversaries: passive and active. A passive adversary230
can be one of the following three entities [27, 11]: (i) the untrusted LBSP, which
collects information about LBS users such as their location, identity or activities,
based on their queries; (ii) an outsider eavesdropper on wireless communication,
which is interested in identifying location and identity of the issuer; (iii) the users
that collaborate in computing the k-anonymity set. The collaborating users are235
not fully trusted; we consider them to be honest-but-curious (we observed that
this assumption is consistent with several works in the literature, such as the
ones in [28, 29, 30]): i.e., users honestly follow the ABAKA protocol, and neither
drop nor modify the packets. However, they are curious to learn location and
identity of the issuer, or of the other users in the k-anonymity set. We assume240
that a malicious user cannot generate fake profiles in order to participate in our
protocol and decrease the privacy level of the issuer, since the CAs authenticate
the users upon joining the network and assign them CP-ABE private keys (we
found this assumption consistent with [31, 32]).
An active adversary can be one of the non-collaborating users who is not245
able to satisfy the access policy on the encrypted packet (i.e., the user who does
not have the issuer-defined attributes). He is interested in identifying the issuer,
modifying the LBS request, or reducing the issuer’s privacy level. In the last
case, he aims at reducing the number of users in the cloaked area (i.e., reducing
the value of k). We assume that both passive and active adversaries have some250
background knowledge about the users [27]. This background information could
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be about profile attributes of the users, such as location information (e.g., office
address), personal information (e.g., age or nationality), or even the exact or
estimated number of users in a geographical location. The adversary aims at
using his background knowledge to attack the privacy of the issuer. In our model,255
we address the collusion attack of non-collaborating users and we assume that
collaborating users do not collude (as they are semi-trusted). Finally, in this
paper we do not consider other types of attacks, such as, Denial of Service, which
is inevitable in all the collaborative approaches in wireless networks.
4. Our solution: ABAKA260
In this section, we present ABAKA, our TTP-free solution that provides
identity privacy for LBS users. ABAKA deals with both generating and sending
the LBS query to the LBSP (Section 4.1), as well as generating and forwarding
the requested location-based service to the issuer.
First, the issuer ui divides the encrypted query into k− 1 parts, and on each265
part enforces a specific access policy by means of CP-ABE [12]. Then, the issuer
sends the packet to the LBSP through a multi-hop path. This way, she conceals
her identity among other k − 1 neighboring users who are able to decrypt the
CP-AB encrypted parts of the packet. Figure 1 provides a high-level example of
our multi-hop attribute-based solution, considering k = 3. As Figure 1 shows,270
the protocol cloaks the position of the issuer (by collaboration of both users with
green tick icon and red cross icon in Figure 1) and computes a k-anonymity set
based on the issuer-defined attributes. Using CP-ABE allows us to address two
important issues:
275
• Finding k − 1 collaborating users (users with green tick icon in Figure 1)
having specific attributes, which could be issuer’s sensitive attributes. En-
forcing a policy on each of the k − 1 parts of the message, the issuer will
be sure that only the users with attributes satisfying the policy, are able
to decrypt one part. Thus, we guarantee that the collaborating users in280
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Figure 1: Multi-hop CP-ABE based routing to form a rectangle cloaked area, example with
k = 3.
the k-anonymity set satisfy p-sensitivity (recall that collaborating users
are honest-but-curious). We assume that each collaborating user uses her
CP-ABE private key only one time for each received packet. In other words,
we assume that if she is able to decrypt some of the CP-AB encrypted
parts of the packet with her private key (satisfying more than one policy),285
she will process just one part. We consider this assumption to ensure that
all the k − 1 parts of the message will be processed by k − 1 different
collaborating users and hence ensuring the k-anonymity.
• Addressing privacy attack form non-collaborating users, i.e., users outside
the cloaked area in Figure 1. As non-collaborating users are not able to290
satisfy any of the access policies, they will not be able to decrypt any of
the query parts. Therefore, they will not be able to reduce the privacy
level of the issuer by collaboration in computing the cloaked area.
In our medical help example, user u1 wants to be 9-anonymous between
eight other users who are female and have the same four digit prefix Zip-code,295
i.e., Gender = female and Zip-code = 0019. Moreover, due to her sensitive
attributes, she is looking for eight other users who are not Italian and have
12
diverse values for the age attribute which fall in three different age categories,
i.e., 15 ∼ 24, 25 ∼ 34, and 35 ∼ 44. User u1 uses ABAKA to conceal her identity.
She encrypts the query Q with the public key of the LBSP, splits it into eight300
equally sized parts and applies an access policy on each part using CP-ABE,
such as (A1 = female) ∧ (A5 = 0019) ∧ (A3 NOT Italian) ∧ (15 ≤ A2 < 25).
This way, she is sure that only the user with the following attributes will be
able to decrypt the corresponding part: who is female, lives in an area with
the same Zip-code prefix as u1, is not Italian, and her age is between 15 and305
24. By defining three different categories for the age attribute (A2), the final
9-anonymity set will be 3-sensitive. As users in the 9-anonymity set have diverse
values from three different categories for sensitive attribute of u1, the probability
that the attacker can identify the issuer’s age category is 13 .
Upon receiving an LBS request packet (the packet with two green parts in310
Figure 1), the LBSP decrypts the query with its private key (skL) obtaining: Q;
a random number s, and random symmetric key kr generated by the issuer; and
the encrypted cloaked area. Then, the LBSP decrypts the cloaked area field by
the obtained kr and generates a response message R considering the cloaked area,
which comprises the location information requested by the issuer. To provide315
confidentiality of the response message, the LBSP encrypts R with s. Finally,
the LBSP sends the generated response packet back to the user that delivered
the query (the user in right top corner of the cloaked area in Figure 1). All the
collaborating users in the k-anonymity set use a semi-onion routing approach [33]
to send the response packet back to the issuer. In particular, semi-onion routing320
allows us to deliver the response packet to the issuer, following the reverse path,
without the need for all the nodes in the path to keep track of the path locally.
This approach is not intended to hide the path from the LBSP to the issuer;
indeed, we leave this as a future work.
4.1. Generate and Forward a Request325
In this section, we describe how a query issuer, ui, is generating and forwarding
an LBS request to the LBSP. In particular, an LBS request packet is composed
13
of the six fields illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed in the following.
CPABEENCpk (MinArea||q1||kr  ,Pi )
MessageHopCount MaxArea DestinationAddress
Encrypted 
MinArea
OneHop 
Address
q1 q2 qk-1
ENCpk  (Q||s||kr )
L The query is then 
split into k-1 parts
Each part is concatenated with a random 
key kr and the MinArea field; then, a 
policy p is applied with CP-ABE
The encrypted parts are concatenated 
and written into the Message field
The query is 
encrypted with pkL
1
2
3
4
CPABEENCpk  (MinArea||qk-1||kr  ,Pj )
ENCk  (MinArea)r
5 The MinArea field is encrypted 
with the random symmetric key kr
ABAKA 
Packet
Figure 2: LBS request packet format generated by the issuer.
The Message field contains the query Q, a random number s, and a randomly
generated symmetric key kr encrypted with the public key, pkL, of the LBSP.330
This message is then split into k − 1 parts, each encrypted with CP-ABE
applying a certain policy, and finally recomposed. The HopCount field denotes
the maximum number of hops that the packet should pass through other users.
Its value should be greater than k− 1. The MaxArea field denotes the maximum
size of the desired cloaked area in the form of a rectangle, which is defined by two335
points (xl, yl) and (xr, yr) for bottom left and top right corners of the rectangle,
respectively. The MinArea field represents the minimum size of the desired
cloaked area in the form of a rectangle, which is defined by two points (x′l, y
′
l)
and (x′r, y
′
r) for bottom left and top right corners of the rectangle, respectively.
The content of this field is encrypted with the randomly generated symmetric340
key kr. After completing the cloaking procedure, this field represents the actual
cloaked area dimensions. OneHopAddress is used for routing back the LBSP
response to the issuer of the query. The initial value of this field is Enckui (r),
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where r is a random number generated by the issuer ui. Upon receiving the
LBS request packet, each user encrypts the address of the previous hop with345
her symmetric secret key (kui) and appends this encrypted layer to the current
content of the OneHopAddress field. Finally, DestinationAddress contains the
address of the LBSP.
4.1.1. Packet Generation
An issuer ui generates a packet executing the Algorithm 1, which comprises350
the following steps:
Step 1. The query issuer, ui, generates a Message which comprises her
query, Q, a random number, s, and a randomly generated symmetric key kr
encrypted with the public key, pkL, of the LBSP (Algorithm 1, lines 2-3).
Step 2. The issuer splits the encrypted Message into k − 1 parts (e.g., in355
chunks of equal size), where k is the k-anonymity parameter (Algorithm 1, line 4).
Then, she defines the minimum size of the desired cloaked area, MinArea field
(Algorithm 1, line 5). She appends the MinArea field and also the symmetric key
kr to each part and encrypts that part with CP-ABE, specifying an access policy,
i.e., a combination of desired attributes (Algorithm 1, lines 6-8). The reason360
behind including MinArea field in each part is to provide each collaborating user
with the means of checking whether the actual minimum desired cloaked area
defined by the issuer has been modified during the path by intermediate nodes
(we will provide a further discussion in Section 4.2).
Step 3. The issuer creates an empty packet (Algorithm 1, line 9), as365
illustrated in Figure 2. Then, she concatenates the k − 1 parts generated in the
previous step to form a complete message (Algorithm 1, line 10). Afterward,
ui defines her privacy requirements in terms of maximum number of neighbors
that the message should pass through, the maximum and minimum size of the
desired cloaked area, and the destination address, i.e., the address of the LBSP370
(Algorithm 1, lines 11-14). The issuer ui encrypts the MinArea field of the header
with kr, to avoid eavesdroppers or non-collaborating users to be able to read (or
modify) such information (Algorithm 1, line 13).
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Algorithm 1 LBS Packet Generation.
Input: The LBS query Q, the anonymity parameter k, an array of policies, the maximum
hop count max, the largest cloaked area limits ((xl, yl), (xr, yr)), the smallest cloaked area
limits ((x′l, y
′
l), (x
′
r, y
′
r)), and the Destination address Destination.
1: procedure GenerateRequest(k, policies[ ], Q,max, (xl, yl),
(xr, yr), (x′l, y
′
l), (x
′
r, y
′
r))
2: kr ← RandomKey(); s← RandomNumber();
3: Message← EncpkL(Q||s);
4: parts[ ]← Split(Messageenc, k − 1) ;
5: minArea←Area((x′l, y′l),(x′r, y′r));
6: for i ∈ [1 : k − 1] do
7: parts[i] ←
CpabeEncpk(minArea||parts[i]||kr, policies[i]);
8: end for
9: packet← GenerateEmptyPacket();
10: packet.Message← Concatenate(parts[ ]);
11: packet.HopCount← max;
12: packet.MaxArea← Area((xl, yl),(xr, yr));
13: packet.MinArea← Enckr (minArea);
14: packet.DestinationAddress← Destination;
15: r ← Random();
16: packet.OneHopAddress← Enckui (r);
17: Forward(packet, neighbors[ ]);
18: end procedure
Step 4. Before sending the packet to a next hop, ui encrypts a random
number r with her symmetric secret key (kui), and attaches it to the packet375
(Algorithm 1, lines 15-16). Finally, ui sends the generated packet to one of her
neighbors. The choice of the next-hop can be done in several ways, e.g., selecting
randomly or based on the proximity with the issuer (Algorithm 1, line 17).
In the medical help example, user u1 splits the encrypted query into eight
parts. Then, she defines her desired smallest cloaked area (MinArea) which could380
be 100 m× 100 m rectangle including her house (the house is not necessarily
placed in the center of the defined area). She concatenates the MinArea to each
part along with a random symmetric key kr, and applies the aforementioned
policies on each part. Afterward, she determines her largest desired cloaked area,
MaxArea, which is a 600 m×600 m rectangle including her geographical position385
and the maximum number of hops (e.g., HopCount=15). Then she encrypts a
random number r with her symmetric key (ku1) and specifies the address of the
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LBSP. Finally, she forwards the generated packet to one of her neighbors.
4.1.2. Packet Forwarding
Once received a packet, a user uj performs the following operations (the390
packet forwarding procedure’s flowchart is depicted in Figure 3):
Step 1. User uj checks whether she resides in the largest desired cloaked
area defined in the MaxArea field of the packet.
Step 2. If uj resides in the defined area, she peruses the packet fields
to decide, based on her own policies, whether she wants to participate in the395
cloaking algorithm. If she does not want to collaborate, she forwards the packet
to another user. Otherwise, she performs the following actions:
• Step 2.1: The user uj checks the Message field of the packet, to verify
whether there is any encrypted part, and if she is able to decrypt one of
them. User uj will be able to decrypt one part, if and only if the attributes400
associated to her profile (i.e, attributes associated to her private key skuj )
satisfy the policy enforced on that part. If able to decrypt, uj decrypts the
MinArea field of the packet header, i.e., Packet.MinArea, using the key
kr obtained from the CP-ABE decrypted part. Then, uj compares such
field with the Part.MinArea field: if Packet.MinArea < Part.MinArea,405
it means that an attacker has decreased the original value defined by the
issuer. In such a case, uj discards the packet. Otherwise, uj continues by
checking whether she resides in the area defined by the Packet.MinArea.
If not, uj enlarges the area to include also her location. Then, she updates
the part she is currently processing, by removing the Part.MinArea field410
and kr and encrypting such part with kr.
• Step 2.2: The user uj updates the current value of the OneHopAddress
concatenating the address of the previous hop, and encrypting the whole
content of the field with her symmetric secret key (kuj ). This way she
adds a new “onion layer” that will be used to route the response message415
back to the issuer. Then, uj decrements the value of the HopCount field.
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Figure 3: Packet forwarding flowchart.
If uj is the one who decrypted the last part with her CP-ABE key, she
decrypts all the previous parts with the key kr. Then, if HopCount= 0,
uj removes the MaxArea and HopCount fields of the packet header, and
sends the query to the LBSP. The coordinates (x′l, y
′
l) and (x
′
r, y
′
r) in the420
Packet.MinArea field represent the actual cloaked area, i.e., the smallest
area covering the positions of all the collaborating users. If HopCount> 0,
uj continues forwarding the packet to one of her neighbors.
• Step 2.3: If there are other encrypted parts (i.e., the packet did not pass
enough users to guarantee k-anonymity), or if the user was not able to425
decrypt one of the parts of the message, uj continues forwarding the
packet to one of her neighbors. Before forwarding the packet, uj checks
the HopCount value. If HopCount= 0, uj discards the packet. Otherwise,
forwards the packet again.
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Step 3. If uj does not reside in the defined largest cloaked area, she can430
perform one of the following actions: drop the packet, forward it to a random
neighbor, or send the packet back to the previous user.
The protocol explained in this section ensures that the query is forwarded
through, at least, k − 1 neighboring users having specific attributes, ensuring
k-anonymity and p-sensitivity.435
4.2. Discussion
In this section we briefly discuss issues related to packet generation and
forwarding, as well as the privacy level provided by ABAKA.
4.2.1. Packet Generation
To ensure that the smallest cloaked area specified by the issuer will be440
respected, we introduced the MinArea field in the ABAKA packet. This field is
of extreme importance in order to guarantee the desired privacy level for the
query issuer. Indeed, on one hand, an attacker might want to increase such area
to reduce the quality of service; and, on the other hand, the attacker might also
want to reduce the value of the MinArea field, in this case attempting to reduce445
the privacy guarantees of the ABAKA. In order to prevent these two attacks, we
place the MinArea field inside each of the CP-ABE encrypted parts of the query.
We also encrypt the MinArea field of the packet header with a secret symmetric
key (kr), which can be accessed only by the collaborating users after decrypting
a CP-ABE part. This way, only the collaborating users are able to modify this450
field as well as verifying the possible malicious modifications to the packet, and
eventually discarding it. Similarly, also the MaxArea and HopCount fields might
be targeted by an attacker, who may want to enlarge or reduce their values.
However, such possible attacks would lead to a Denial of Service, that is out of
the scope of this work.455
4.2.2. Packet Forwarding
During the packet forwarding process, we may have some concerns. First, par-
ticipating in the ABAKA protocol may threaten the privacy of the collaborating
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users. Indeed, the issuer could infer that there are people with specific attributes
in the cloaked area, simply by issuing several ABAKA messages adopting dif-460
ferent policies. We addressed this concern by allowing each user who receives
the packet to decide whether to participate in the protocol or not. Therefore, if
a user receives a packet, which has some parts that specify her own sensitive
attributes, she can decide to not decrypt such part and just forward the packet
to a neighbor. Another possible solution for this problem could be considering465
each collaborating user to be able to influence the packet, e.g., enlarging the
minimum cloaked area and then decrypting the packet. In this way, she can
cloak herself in a larger area.
The second concern is the participation of users with revoked attributes.
This issue is mainly related to the key revocation mechanisms for CP-ABE, and470
therefore is out of the scope of this paper. We will leave such concern as a future
work.
A third issue is the collusion of non-collaborating users, that might want
to send the packet to the LBSP when only a portion of CP-ABE parts are
already decrypted. In such a scenario, the LBSP may be able to extract some475
useful information from the currently decrypted parts. We addressed this issue
introducing a random symmetric key (kr) that each collaborating user will
obtain after decrypting a CP-ABE part; after processing the MinArea field (as
explained in Section 4.1.2), each collaborating user will encrypt with kr the
part she decrypted with her CP-ABE private key. In this way, even in case of480
collusion attack, the LBSP receives an encrypted packet and cannot infer any
useful information.
Another privacy concern is the mobility of the collaborating users which
may lead to a reduction of the k-anonymity level, in a case that some of the
collaborating users leave the cloaked area. Although we assumed users to be in a485
limited mobility scenario, we could integrate mobility and movement directions
in computing the cloaked area to support also dynamic networks (e.g., taking
into account the speed of the collaborating users, and computing how much
they could move by the time the response comes back, and computing whether
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they will still be reachable). However, such integration is not trivial, since it490
depends on several parameters (e.g., its domain of application), and requires
a trade-off between privacy level, overhead, and trust to some central entities
(such a trade-off is a common issue in collaborative approaches, such as in [34]).
We leave the management of nodes’ mobility as a future work.
The other issue could be continuous request of a same LBS by a user u in495
a cloaked area. In this case, the LBSP might identify the user by correlation
of the requests over time. In such case, overtime if the other individuals in the
anonymity set are changed, then the user u could be the one who is requesting
the same query. This attack can happen in two cases: (i) if the attacker has
a general view over the path, which could be solved by using some kind of500
anonymous routing, (ii) if the attacker has local real-time knowledge about the
individuals in the set and the query content, and also have historical information
about the previous same requests and the individuals in that sets. We leave a
thorough study of the latter attack as future work.
Finally, another issue is the delay imposed by the multi-hop forwarding, and505
finding k − 1 users with specific attributes. ABAKA is most effective in dense
environments (in which the probability of finding collaborating users in vicinity
is high) and non real-time scenarios. It provides a strong privacy protection
considering the issuer profile attributes varying for each user and query, with the
cost of imposing delay to the system. In many applications, the issuer is willing510
to accept a trade-off between strong privacy protection (by defining strict access
policies) and latency (or not receiving response at all). We could also define a
maximum time bound for the reception of the response: if the issuer does not
receive the response within a certain time frame, she can decide to relax the
privacy constraints and re-issue the query. It is worth mentioning that, as a515
design choice, we attributed higher priority to users’ privacy, with respect to
the quality of service. Therefore, in the case of not finding enough collaborating
users, the issued query will not be submitted to the LBSP and the issuer will
still be anonymous, but we do not ensure that she will receive her requested
service.520
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4.2.3. Privacy Discussion
As introduced in Section 3.2, we consider the following adversaries separately:
(i) the untrusted LBSP; (ii) an outsider eavesdropper; (iii) the semi-trusted
collaborating users; (iv) the untrusted non-collaborating users. We now discuss
how ABAKA protects users against these adversaries.525
(i) Consider the medical help example. Based on the content of the query,
the LBSP could infer that the sender is a foreign woman, probably between
15 and 45 years old. However, even with background knowledge about profile
attributes of women in that area, it could not infer which of these women could
be the issuer. In fact, there are at least nine women in the age range between 15530
and 44, with different nationalities.
(ii) The outsider eavesdropper observes the communication between the users.
He is not able to access the content of the packet since it is encrypted with
CP-ABE, and with the public key of the LBSP. If he can observe all the path,
he can find out the issuer and if he has background knowledge about what535
could be the issuer’s query, he may only be able to infer some attributes of
the collaborating users; however, it is a strong assumption about the adversary.
One can think about an on top anonymized routing layer which could be an
orthogonal solution to be used along with the ABAKA, and we leave it as a
future work.540
(iii) There is no useful information inside the LBS packet for honest-but-
curious collaborating users; the content of the message is encrypted with the
public key of the LBSP, and both location and identity of the issuer are hidden.
A curious collaborating user could obtain only knowledge about attributes of all
the collaborating users, or, at least, attributes of a subset of collaborating users.545
(iv) Non-collaborating users may try to reduce the privacy level of the issuer
(e.g., in the previous example, a man could try to collaborate in computing the
cloaked area to decrease the value of k) or to modify the packet. Using CP-ABE,
users without specific attributes are not able to decrypt the packet. Therefore,
they can neither modify the packet nor collaborate in the k-anonymity set to550
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reduce the privacy level for the issuer.
5. Experimental Results
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of ABAKA, using two
different datasets. In Section 5.1 we provide performance evaluation of ABAKA
in terms of success rate considering different scenarios; while in Section 5.2555
we investigate the overhead imposed by the cryptographic operations in our
proposed approach.
5.1. Performance Evaluation
For the purpose of evaluating ABAKA in a realistic scenario, we created
two synthetic datasets based on real world statistics of the population of two560
cities: New York (USA), focusing on the Manhattan island, and Milan (Italy). In
particular, we estimated the average number of ABAKA users in an area of 1 km2,
based on: (1) the average population density in such cities, obtained from [35]
and [36]; (2) the statistics on the smartphone penetration in the state of belonging,
i.e., the percentage of population owning a smartphone, according to [37] and565
[38]; and (3) a hypothetical percentage of the smartphone users with the ABAKA
application installed (50%, 60%, and 70% were considered). Moreover, in our
evaluation we assumed a WiFi range of 25 meters for each device [39]. Table 2
shows some statistics about the considered datasets, in particular the number
of users per km2, the percentage of considered collaborating users, and the570
average number of neighboring collaborators for each user. As we can see form
Table 2, the Milan dataset represents a non-dense scenario. Indeed, the average
collaborating neighbors per ABAKA user, spans, on average, form 2.99 to only
4.00, with a percentage of ABAKA users in the smartphone-users population of
50% and 70%, respectively. The New York dataset, instead, represents a “best575
case” scenario, where the average connection degree per ABAKA user is high,
e.g., some 23.89 neighbors on average, considering a 60% ABAKA users in the
smartphone-users population.
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Table 2: Statistics on the considered datasets (data extracted from [35, 36, 37, 38])
City
Inhabitants Smartphone ABAKA Neighboring Users
per km2 Users (%) Users (%) Average Std. Dev.
New York 27,733 64%
50 20.00 4.82
60 23.89 5.31
70 27.85 5.79
Milan 7,382 41%
50 2.99 1.99
60 3.37 2.08
70 4.00 2.24
To evaluate the performance of ABAKA, we measured the average success
rate for a query packet to be received by the LBSP, varying the maximum580
allowed size of the cloaked area, from 100 m2, to 600 m2, with steps increase of
100 m2, as well as the maximum allowed hops number, i.e., 10, 15 and 20 hops.
In our evaluation, we performed our experiments considering two possibilities
for a user to forward a message to a neighbor, i.e., she can forward the packet
to: (1) the closest neighbor, or (2) a random one. We also considered different585
possible actions that a user can perform when receiving a packet outside of
the largest possible cloaked area. In this case, she can decide to: (i) drop the
packet, (ii) forward it to a random neighbor, or (iii) return the packet back to
the previous user, which in turn will select another user to which forward the
message. However, in our experiments we did not consider option (i), since it590
would reduce the probability for a message to complete the protocol.
We considered four different types of attributes for the population, reported
in Table 3. The table reports also the distribution of attribute values in the
population, extracted from [35]. We performed 1000 runs of the ABAKA
protocol, each time randomly initializing the configuration according to the595
values in Table 3, and randomly selecting a different issuer.
Our evaluation of ABAKA considers the following two different policy com-
binations, where parentheses delimit a policy enforced on a single message part
(considered notation is consistent with the reported attributes in Table 3):
(a) [(A ≥ 18 ∧ S = f ), (A ≥ 18 ∧ S = f ), (A ≥ 18 ∧ S = f ), (A ≥ 18 ∧ S = f )]600
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Table 3: Considered attributes and their distribution, according to the data in [35]
Attribute Attribute value
Presence in the
population (%)
Sex (S)
male (m) 47.5
female (f) 52.5
Race (R)
white (w) 33
black (b) 25.5
latino or hispanic (h) 28
asian (s) 12.7
american indian (a) 0.8
Origin (O)
foreign born (f) 37
local born (l) 63
Age (A)
< 18 21.6
between 18 and 65 66.3
≥ 65 12.1
(b) [(A ≥ 18 ∧O = l), (A ≥ 18 ∧ R = h)]
Policies combination (a) provides at least 5-anonymity, and 1-sensitivity,
while polcies combination (b) provides at least 3-anonymity and 2-sensitivity.
Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 present the results of our simulation, adopting the
different strategies introduced above, with set of policies (a) on the Milan dataset;605
Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 presents the results of our simulation with set of policies
(a) on the New York dataset. For the sake of brevity, for policies combination
(b) we report only the results obtained on both datasets, with strategy (1) for
selecting the next collaborating user, and strategy (iii) to handle the out-of-area
case. We report these results in Figure 12 and Figure 13.610
From our results, we can derive some useful observations. First of all, we
notice that, unsurprisingly, the average number of collaborating neighbors per
ABAKA user (listed in Table 2) influences the success rate of our proposal. This
is more evident if we consider the Milan dataset. As an example, Figure 4 shows
a significative increase of the success rate, i.e., from a maximum of some 60% to615
a maximum of some 70%, as the number of ABAKA users (and consequently
the number of neighbors per user) grows. However, note that even in non-dense
25
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Figure 4: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the Milan dataset.
Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user returns
the message to previous user.
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Figure 5: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the Milan dataset.
Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user forwards
the message to a random neighbor.
scenarios, ABAKA achieves a reasonable success rate, e.g., in Figure 4(c) we
can observe that ABAKA is capable to achieve a success rate of some 70%,
considering a maximum of 20 hops and a maximum cloaked area size of 200 m2.620
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Figure 6: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the Milan dataset.
Each user forwards the message to a random neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user returns
the message to previous user.
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(a) 50% ABAKA users.
100 200 300 400 500 600
Cloaked Area Size (m2 )
0
20
40
60
80
100
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e 
(%
)
10 hops 15 hops 20 hops
(b) 60% ABAKA users.
100 200 300 400 500 600
Cloaked Area Size (m2 )
0
20
40
60
80
100
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e 
(%
)
10 hops 15 hops 20 hops
(c) 70% ABAKA users.
Figure 7: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the Milan dataset.
Each user forwards the message to a random neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user forwards
the message to a random neighbor.
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(a) 50% ABAKA users.
100 200 300 400 500 600
Cloaked Area Size (m2 )
0
20
40
60
80
100
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e 
(%
)
10 hops 15 hops 20 hops
(b) 60% ABAKA users.
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Figure 8: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the New York dataset.
Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user returns
the message to previous user.
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Figure 9: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the New York dataset.
Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user forwards
the message to a random neighbor.
Second, we can observe that both the maximum number of allowed hops,
as well as the maximum cloacked area size, play an important role. The effect
of the maximum number of hops is evident from the results of the experiment
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(a) 50% ABAKA users.
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Figure 10: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the New York
dataset. Each user forwards the message to a random neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user
returns the message to previous user.
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Figure 11: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (a) on the New York
dataset. Each user forwards the message to a random neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user
forwards the message to a random neighbor.
performed on the New York dataset. For example, from Figure 11 we can see
that adopting a maximum number of hops of 20, brings the success rate of the625
protocol to greater than 90%, while a maximum of 10 hops leads to a success
rate lower than 60%. Analogously, the effect of the adopted bigger maximum
cloacked area size can be observed from Figure 4 to Figure 11; as an example,
Figure 4(a) shows that, with a maximum of 20 hops, a maximum cloacked area
size of 100 m2 leads to an average success rate of some 50%, while when the630
maximum cloacked area size is 600 m2, the success rate is some 60% an average.
5.2. Cryptographic Overhead
For a thorough evaluation of ABAKA, we estimated the overhead introduced
by the cryptographic tools used in our protocol. In particular, we measured
the average time required for encryption and decryption with CP-ABE, RSA,635
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Figure 12: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (b) on the Milan dataset.
Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user returns
the message to previous user.
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Figure 13: Success rate of ABAKA simulating policies combination (b) on the New York
dataset. Each user forwards the message to its closest neighbor; outside the cloaked area, user
returns the message to previous user.
and AES-CBC. We considered two different platforms: a laptop equipped with
4x1.8 GHz Intel Core i7-4500U processor, and 8 GB RAM, running Ubuntu
14.04; and a smartphone equipped with a 1.2 GHz dual-core ARM Cortex-A9
CPU processor, and 1 GB RAM, running Android 4.3 “Jelly Bean”.
On both platforms, we evaluated CP-ABE using the ABE implementation for640
Android devices we proposed in [40]1. Figure 14 shows the results of our measure-
ments on a 250 KB file (we believe that this is a reasonable size assumption for
a piece of query encrypted in the protocol). Since the time required by CP-ABE
mainly depends on the number of attributes employed in the cryptographic
operations [12], we considered a varying number of attributes for policies and645
1The code of the library is available at http://spritz.math.unipd.it/projects/andraben/
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keys from one to 20.
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Figure 14: Average time required for encryption and decryption operations using CP-ABE on
an Android smartphone and a Laptop device.
As we can see from Figure 14, even adopting a large number of attributes,
the time required by CP-ABE implementation for encryption and decryption is
low, on both smartphone and laptop. For a more comprehensive overview of the
performance of ABE on smartphone devices, the reader may refer to our recent650
work [40]. Additionally, we measured the average encryption and decryption
time for RSA, with key size of 4096 bits, and AES-CBC with key size of 256 bits.
On both platforms, we employed the openssl library [41], that we cross compiled
for Android. We measured RSA encryption and decryption for a key of size
256 bits; while for AES-CBC, we considered a file of size 1 MB. Table 4 shows655
the results of our measurements. As we can see, for both RSA and AES-CBC,
the imposed overhead is very small.
Table 4: Average encryption/decryption time for RSA/AES-CBC on Smartphone and Laptop.
Scheme
Smartphone Laptop
Encrypt Decrypt Encrypt Decrypt
RSA 7.5101 ms 0.0156 ms 0.153 ms 0.001 ms
AES-CBC* 26.199 ms 26.517 ms 2.809 ms 3.953 ms
AES-CBC** 110.179 ms 109.574 ms 11.072 ms 15.526 ms
* Encryption/decryption of a 250 KByte file
** Encryption/decryption of a 1 MByte file
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The results we obtained confirm the applicability of ABAKA not only on
powerful devices such as laptops, but also on smartphone devices. As an
example, consider an anonymity level k = 5, and policies composed by three660
attributes (which we believe are expressive enough to successfully guarantee
p-sensitivity). In this case, the average overhead on an Android smartphone
would be approximately (0.27613 × 5) + 0.00751 + 0.11018 = 1.49834 s for
the issuer, who has to encrypt the query with a symmetric key, that in turn
is encrypted with LBSP’s public key (this is a common usage of public key665
encryption), and encrypt each part of the split message with CP-ABE. Each
collaborating user has to decrypt a part of the query with her CP-ABE private
key, and immediately encrypt it with AES-CBS. Therefore, the approximate
overhead will be 0.13275 + 0.26199 = 0.15894 s. Finally, the last collaborating
user have to decrypt all the parts that are previously encrypted with AES-CBC.670
Therefore, she will incur in an additional overhead of 0.02651× 5 = 0.13255 s.
6. Related Work
The concept of k-anonymity was first introduced for databases applica-
tions [42], and later applied in the context of LBSs [5]: the user’s position is
translated into a cloaked area and provided to the LBSP along with the requested675
query. The concept of k-anonymity has been extended in several aspects, e.g.,
l-diversity [43], and t-closeness [44]. Moreover, in [9] the authors proposed a
p-sensitive approach for LBSs, which provides query l-diversity by classifying
queries into sensitive and non-sensitive groups. However, unlike our work, none
of these approaches considered both (i) query semantics, and (ii) sensitive profile680
attributes of each user, at the same time.
Bamba et al. [45] proposed an approach to provide k-anonymity and location
l-diversity for LBS users. In this scheme, mobile users are not identifiable from
k − 1 other users in a set of l different physical locations such as hospitals, bars
and university. This scheme utilizes one or more anonymization servers between685
users and LBSP to perform spatio-temporal cloaking.
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In traditional approaches for k-anonymity in LBSs, the computation of the
cloaked area is carried out by an anonymization server to which the query is
first forwarded. Such solutions are typically referred as TTP-based schemes.
However, the use of a centralized anonymizer offers a single point of attack, and690
may represent a serious bottleneck for the overall system. To overcome these
limitations, researchers proposed several distributed solutions that compute the
cloaked area in a collaborative way, referred to as TTP-free solutions. For an
overview of the main existing TTP-free solutions, the reader can refer to [46].
Unfortunately, most of the existing schemes (both TTP-free and TTP-based)695
do not consider the background knowledge of the attackers, except from only a
few recently proposed approaches [11]. However, an attacker with background
information about a user’s profile might be able to identify her, even if her
location is hidden [47]. k-anonymity preserving solutions try to overcome the
above issues, by considering user profiles information [6, 48]. However, unlike our700
work, all the aforementioned profile-based schemes are centralized, and might be
subject to the limitations introduced before. To the best of our knowledge, our
proposal is the first TTP-free approach for p-sensitive profile k-anonymity in
LBS that considers user’s profile attributes.
7. Conclusions705
Location and identity privacy in Location-Based Services are major concerns
for users who want to protect their privacy from a malicious LBSP, as well
as from an eavesdropper. While several solutions for guaranteeing privacy in
LBSs have been proposed in the literature, they are often centralized, or do
not take into account the prior knowledge of the attacker about user profiles.710
In this paper we present ABAKA, our collaborative solution that guarantees
k-anonymity, as well as p-sensitivity in LBSs, taking into account the issued
query semantics. In our approach, users have a set of attributes associated to
their profile. Their attributes are bound to a CP-ABE private key. An LBS
message is first processed by the issuer, and then forwarded through a multi-hop715
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route to the LBSP. ABAKA enables each issuer to delimit a cloaked area within
which she wants to be anonymous, and to specify a list of k − 1 policies, i.e.,
attribute combinations, that users in the multi-hop path must satisfy in order
to forward the query message to the LBSP. ABAKA provides the possibility of
performing a trade-off between the stringency of privacy protection and quality720
of service for the issuer in her current location, based on the query semantics. We
addressed the threat of active and passive adversaries by means of CP-ABE and
multi-hop routing approaches. We simulated our protocol on synthetic datasets
derived from real population statistics (considering two cities: New York (USA),
and Milan (Italy)), and demonstrated that our approach is feasible and efficient.725
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